“I guess the question I'm asked the most often is: "When you were sitting in that capsule listening to the count-down, how did you feel?" Well, the answer to that one is easy. I felt exactly how you would feel if you were getting ready to launch and knew you were sitting on top of two million parts — all built by the lowest bidder on a government contract.”
― John Glenn
The Space Shuttle Challenger disaster occurred on January 28, 1986.. Most of us alive will never forget that moment. Many really don't remember much of the cause. Yes, cold weather caused it, but was that the vehicle was never certified to operate in temperatures that low. The O-rings, as well as many other critical components, had no test data to support any expectation of a successful launch in such conditions. Bob Ebeling from Thiokol delivered a biting analysis: "[W]e're only qualified to 40 degrees …'what business does anyone even have thinking about 18 degrees, we're in no man's land.'
But the fact that the Reagan Administration pushed hard for NASA to launch shuttle mission 51L, before it was ready, has mainly been ignored. Ronald Reagan wanted Challenger in orbit with teacher Christine McAuliffe so that he could speak with her live during his State of the Union speech. I am not suggesting that he was to blame – he wasn't, but a culture had arisen in NASA that they could do no wrong, and 'if the President wanted it, we could do it' attitude existed. This was revealed by Richard Cook, then a budget analyst at NASA, who leaked documents to the New York Times. The papers acquired significance for predicting that faulty rubber seals on the solid fuel rockets could trigger a catastrophe, as the official investigation indeed concluded. In this memoir and personal investigation, Cook justifies his leak, or, from another perspective, his violation of trust, and proposes a theory for why NASA managers launched after overruling objections from the rocket engineers. It is this: President Ronald Reagan wanted Challenger in orbit with teacher Christine McAuliffe so that he could speak with her live during his State of the Union speech. Cook amasses technical evidence about violations of launch criteria, telephone calls between NASA and the White House, and hearsay from an astrologer who, Cook reports, said he was told personally by Reagan that he decided to launch. Whether Cook is holding a blank or a smoking gun, his book is sure to provoke controversy. Gilbert Taylor Copyright © American Library Association. All rights reserved
The Rogers Commission found NASA's organizational culture and decision-making processes had been key contributing factors to the accident.[1] NASA managers had known contractor Morton Thiokol's design of the SRBs contained a potentially catastrophic flaw in the O-rings since 1977, but failed to address it properly. They also disregarded warnings (an example of "go fever") from engineers about the dangers of launching posed by the low temperatures of that morning and had failed in adequately reporting these technical concerns to their superiors.
May the Rest in Peace! And may we remember them today…
